In this brief note I argue that putting conscious observers at the center of the considerations clarifies and strengthens the many-worlds interpretation. The basic assumption, which seems extremely plausible based on our current understanding of the brain and of decoherence, is that quantum states corresponding to distinct conscious experiences have to be orthogonal. I show that, once this is accepted, probabilistic measurement outcomes corresponding to basis elements and following Born's rule emerge naturally from global unitary dynamics.
Given the great success of quantum physics in the microscopic domain, it is very natural to wonder whether it is universally valid, and in particular whether it can account for our macroscopic experience. Arguing that it can is the program of the "many worlds" interpretation of quantum physics, which was first proposed by Everett in 1957 [1] and developed by many others since then. In this brief note I argue that it is very useful in the context of this approach to put ourselves, i.e. conscious observers, at the center of the considerations. This is not only natural, since our ultimate goal is to explain our experience of the world (which at first sight seems to be in contradiction with the quantum description), but also has considerable explanatory power, especially when combined with our modern understanding of decoherence [2] . In particular, this approach helps to clarify three points that are frequently raised in discussions of "many worlds" [3, 4] . First, it explains why the results of ideal measurements always correspond to bases in Hilbert space, even though there is a continuum of possible quantum states "between" the basis elements. Second, it explains why we experience definite outcomes even though the global quantum state is a superposition of all possibilities. Third, it also takes us a long way towards understanding why the probabilities of these definite outcomes are given by the Born rule.
The reason why thinking about conscious observers is useful in this context is the following. If we assume for the sake of the argument that quantum physics applies to conscious beings, then it is extremely plausible that quantum states that correspond to definite experiences (e.g. the experience of observing "up" or "down" in a Stern-Gerlach type experiment) are mutually orthogonal. This is plausible because neuroscience shows already quite convincingly that different states of conscious experience are associated with different patterns of neural activity in the brain. Moreover the expected decoherence times for superpositions of different firing patterns are extremely short compared to the characteristic timescales of conscious experience [5] . It therefore seems safe to assume that all the possible states of experience of a conscious subject form part of a basis. (Other elements of the same basis correspond to the observer being unconscious, or dead.)
This means that if |A 1 and |A 2 are two states of the conscious subject, Alice, corresponding to two different states of her conscious experience, let's call them "experience 1" and "experience 2", then A 1 |A 2 = 0. Moreover the state α|A 1 +β|A 2 (with α and β both different from zero) does not correspond to any single conscious experience. Instead it corresponds, from Alice's point of view, to a superposition of two different "worlds", one in which she has experience 1, and one where she has experience 2. Note that another observer, Bob, may be perfectly aware that Alice is in a superposition state. If he is technologically very powerful, he could perform the appropriate quantum interference experiment to prove it. In the course of such an experiment Alice would have to lose any reliable memory of her previous experience (i.e. whether it was experience 1 or experience 2). But there appears to be no fundamental problem with such a scenario. In particular her conscious experience does not constitute a hidden variable with greater predictive power than the quantum state. On the contrary, the quantum superposition state α|A 1 + β|A 2 tells the whole story about her as a quantum system, whereas her experience (which corresponds to |A 1 or |A 2 , depending on her "world") does not. One could even imagine Bob telling Alice that really she is in a superposition state. She would have to reply, "This may be so, but based only on my subjective experience there is no way for me to know."
Let me now outline how this point of view helps to clarify the many worlds approach. First, it explains why the possible results of ideal measurements on a quantum system always correspond to states in a certain orthogonal basis. An ideal measurement of a quantum system in a state |S 1 should always give the same result ("state |S 1 !"). By the definition of measurement, this result corresponds to a definite experience for the observer. More formally, we can write the dynamics as |S 1 |O 0 → |O 1 , where |O 0 is the initial state of the observer, which also includes her measurement apparatus, the air in the room etc., and |O 1 is the final state of the observer corresponding to the conscious experience of having found the measurement result "|S 1 !". Note that in our notation the measured quantum system has become part of the extended observer state |O 1 (if it was a photon, for example, it may have been absorbed by a detector). There is no assumption that the measurement can be repeated with the same system [3] . Now suppose that the same measurement procedure, when fed the system state |S 2 , always gives the definite result "|S 2 !". This corresponds to a different state of experience for the observer, which we denote |O 2 , such that the dynamics of the measurement process is now |S 2 |O 0 → |O 2 . From our basic assumption about states of conscious experience it follows that O 1 |O 2 = 0. If the overall dynamics is unitary, which is of course assumed in the many worlds interpretation, then the mappings |S 1 |O 0 → |O 1 and |S 2 |O 0 → |O 2 are compatible only if S 1 |S 2 = 0. Thus different possible results of an ideal measurement always correspond to mutually orthogonal states for the system that is being measured. The preceding argument is inspired by, but different from, the argumentation in Ref. [3] .
Second, there is now a plausible explanation for why observers experience definite and probabilistic outcomes in typical quantum measurements. If the quantum system is originally in the state α|S 1 + β|S 2 (with S 1 |S 2 = 0), then, according to the above dynamics, at the end of the measurement process we will have a state |ψ = α|O 1 + β|O 2 . However, according to our above arguments, only the states |O 1 and |O 2 correspond to definite experiences. There is no single state of experience corresponding to the superposition state. We thus have to conclude that, from the point of view of the observer, the state |ψ is a superposition state of two different "worlds". In one world, the observer experiences outcome 1, in the other one outcome 2.
Since the observer always experiences definite outcomes, she will, on repeating a given experiment, find outcome 1 a certain number of times, outcome 2 a certain number of times etc. (in general there will be more than two possible outcomes). The observer will therefore be led to develop a probabilistic description. Can we understand, based only on the assumption of global unitary dynamics, why the observer will be led to the Born rule? I will now argue that, third, we can at least make a very significant step in that direction [6] .
The observer can of course measure the system in different (system) bases. Her goal is thus to assign probabilities to all these different bases. But Gleason's theorem [7] tells us that there is only one way of assigning probabilities to all elements of all bases in a consistent way, namely to apply Born's rule. In the given framework of global unitary dynamics, Born's rule is therefore the only probability law that the observer's experiments can possibly lead her to.
There is one qualification to this statement. Gleason's theorem assumes that the probabilities are assigned in a non-contextual way. That is, given a quantum state |φ which can be written as |φ = α|1 + β|2 + γ|3 in the basis {|1 , |2 , |3 }, and which can also be writ-
′ } in the subspace spanned by {|2 , |3 }, it is assumed that the probability assigned to |1 for the state |φ does not depend on the choice of basis in the complementary sub-space, i.e. it only depends on the coefficient α. It is interesting to note that standard quantum physics, i.e. the Born rule, is non-contextual in assigning probabilities, while non-contextual "hidden value" assignments are of course impossible [8] .
Is it satisfactory to have non-contextuality of the probability assignment as an assumption? Phrased as above (the probability only depends on the coefficient α) it certainly seems extremely natural. However, there may still be room for a deeper understanding. I find the example of decoherence encouraging in this respect. The deeper physical understanding of its workings that was gained since 1957 has strengthened the many-worlds interpretation very significantly. Maybe a similar further step will eliminate all remaining doubts concerning the inevitability of the Born rule in the many-worlds framework.
I have argued that the key features of our experience (measurement results corresponding to bases, definite results occurring probabilistically, to a large extent also the Born rule) emerge naturally in the many-worlds framework if we place ourselves, i.e. conscious observers, at the center of the consideration. Of course this does not mean that quantum physics is universally valid. This will be decided, and quite possibly proven not be the case, by future experiments, see Ref. [9] for one such attempt. However, I believe that the present considerations strengthen the case for taking the many-worlds point of view seriously, as possibly the most economical version of quantum physics.
